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INDEMNITY PROVISIONS IN WISCONSIN
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
Building and construction contracts frequently contain provisions requiring the subcontractor to indemnify the general
contractor or the owner of the premises against any liability
incurred during the performance of the contract. Although
such provisions are generally upheld by the courts, problems
arise when the general contractor or owner claims that the
contractual indemnity clause indemnifies him from losses occasioned by his own negligence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has dealt with this problem several times, but has been unable
to clearly resolve the issue.
In most jurisdictions contracts indemnifying the indemnitee against his own negligence are not contrary to public policy,' although at least one state statute has declared such a
provision to be "void" and "unenforceable." ' Even when they
are upheld by the courts, such clauses are usually strictly construed against the indemnitee, both because the contract is
typically an adhesion contract drafted by the indemnitee and
because the indemnitee seeks by means of the indemnification
agreement to avoid liability for his negligent acts.' On the other
hand, some jurisdictions have adopted a more liberal test,
construing the contract broadly to effectuate the intent of the
1. Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 663 (1966); 50 MARQ. L. REv. 77 (1966); United States v.
Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211 (1970), which states:
[W]e agree ... that a contractual provision should not be construed to permit
an indemnitee to recover for his own negligence unless the court is firmly convinced that such an interpretation reflects the intention of the parties. This
principle, though variously articulated, is accepted with virtual unanimity
among American jurisdictions.
2. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29, § 61 (Smith-Herd), reads:
With respect to contracts or agreements, either public or private, for the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building, structure, highway
bridge, viaducts or other work dealing with construction, or for any moving,
demolition or excavation connected therewith, every covenant, promise or agreement to indemnify or hold harmless another person from that person's own
negligence is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
3. Auto Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 414 F.2d 192 (7th
Cir. 1969); Hardeman, Inc. v. Hass Co., 246 Ark. 559, 439 S.W.2d 281 (1969); Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Elmore, Fla., 189 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1966); Guernick v. Herlihy
Co., 180 Neb. 839, 146 N.W.2d 211 (1966); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 47 Ohio App. 2d 344, 72 N.E.2d 388 (1946), appeal
dismissed, 148 Ohio St. 148, 73 N.E.2d 805 (1947).
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parties, thus frequently permitting indemnification of the indemnitee.'
I.

WISCONSIN CASE LAW

Wisconsin first construed a clause indemnifying the indemnitee for his own negligence in HartfordAccident & Indemnity
Co. v. Worden-Alien Co.' The plaintiff Hartford was the insurer of Seaman Body Corporation. Seaman contracted with
Permanent Construction Company to erect a building, and
Permanent subcontracted the structual steel work to the defendant Worden-Allen. The subcontract contained the following
indemnity clause:
In accepting this order you agree to indemnify, reimburse and
save harmless the owner and us of and from all loss and
damage to person or property and all claims, suits or demands arising from damages or injuries to you and your employees, ourselves and our employees, the owner and his employees, other contractors and their employees, and the general public, due to, arising from, or connected with your operations on this job.'
An employee of Worden-Allen was injured when a crane came
into contact with an uninsulated power line maintained by the
owner Seaman. The injured employee recovered a judgment
against Seaman7 which was paid by Hartford, Seaman's insurer. As a result, Hartford was subrogated to Seaman's rights
and sued Worden-Allen, claiming that by the indemnity clause
Worden-Allen agreed to hold harmless both Permanent and the
owner Seaman. The Wisconsin court held that the defendant
Worden-Allen was liable under the contract to indemnify Seaman because Worden-Allen's active negligence directly contributed to the employee's injuries, while Seaman's negligence
was merely passive. However, in dicta the court also noted that
if the employee's injuries had been caused solely by the negligence of Seaman, the indemnitee, Seaman would not be enti4. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 189 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1951); Grimshaw Co. v. Wright Elec. Co., 283 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Tex. 1968);
Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Fluor Corp., 4 Ariz. App. 476, 421 P.2d 909 (1967); Jacobsen
v. Ravenhorst Corp., 301 Minn. 202, 221 N.W.2d 703 (1974); Cozzi v. Owens Coming
Fibre Glass Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 117, 164 A.2d 69 (1960).
5. 238 Wis. 124, 297 N.W. 436 (1941).
6. Id. at 127, 297 N.W.at 438.
7. Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp., 233 Wis. 606, 290 N.W. 177 (1940).
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tled to indemnification under the contract.
This dicta in HartfordAccident was crucial to the result in
Mustas v. Inland Construction Co.' The plaintiff, Mustas, an
employee of one of the defendant Inland's subcontractors,
slipped on an icy floor at the construction site and was injured.
The trial court found Inland 100 percent negligent, but Inland
maintained that two other subcontractors, F. Rosenberg Elevator Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, had
agreed to indemnify the general contractor against his own
negligence. Relying on HartfordAccident, the court recognized
that to idemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence, even
for the breach of nondelegable duties under the safe place statute is not contrary to public policy.' Inland's contract with both
subcontractors read:
The subcontractor assumes full responsibility and risk for
any and all damage to person or property in the performance
of the contract arising out of the assumed work, whether directly or indirectly, to be performed by said subcontractor,
and does hereby agree to and shall hold the owner and contractor ... free from, and harmless of and from, any and all

claims for injury, including death... resulting from or arising
out of, and in connection with, any of the subcontractor's
operations .

.

. [and] agrees to forever hold, save and keep

harmless and fully indemnify Inland and the owner... and
the general public, of and from all liabilities, damages,
claims, recoveries, costs, and expenses because of loss of or
damage to property or injury to or deaths of persons in any
way arising out of or in connection with the performance of
this contract.'"
Despite the general and comprehensive language of this provision, the court applied the majority view which strictly construes such clauses and held that since it did not "expressly
provide" for such coverage, it did not permit indemnity for the
indemnitee's own negligence.
In Algrem v. Nowlan,1 faced with the mutual negligence of
both the indemnitor and the indemnitee, the court qualified
the rule of strict construction. In that case, an employee of the
8. 19 Wis. 2d 194, 120 N.W.2d 95 (1963).
9. Id. at 205, 120 N.W.2d at 101. See also Boden, The Problemof Indemnity under

the Safe-Place Statute, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 349 (1957).
10. 19 Wis. 2d at 205-206, 120 N.W.2d at 101.
11. 37 Wis. 2d 70, 154 N.W.2d 217 (1967).
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lessee of a building was injured when he slipped on accumulated ice. Although his recovery from the employer was limited
to his worker's compensation award, he subsequently sued the
owners of the building.
The owners claimed that an indemnification covenant in
the lease obligated the lessee to indemnify the owners for losses
sustained because of the negligent acts of the lessee in maintaining or repairing the premises. The court applied a broad
rule of construction to uphold the owners' claim. The court also
pointed out that it would apply a strict rule of construction to
an indemnity clause requiring the lessee to indemnify the owners for any liability that might arise from structural defects or
the owners' failure to repair. The court stressed that the rule
of strict construction applies only when the indemnity clause
covers the negligent acts of the indemnitee. This qualification
is a natural outgrowth of the common law principle that a
person should not be required to indemnify another against
that party's negligent acts unless such an intention is expressed
clearly and unequivocally in the indemnity agreement. By contrast, where an indemnitor contracts to indemnify against liability caused by his own negligent acts, a broad rule of construction is consistent with public policy. In fact, as the court
noted, there is usually no real need for an express provision of
indemnity in such a situation, since a common law right of
indemnity generally exists. 2
The court implicitly reasserted this distinction in Young v.
Anaconda American Brass.3 In this case, Young, an employee
of a subcontractor was injured on the defendant Anaconda's
premises when he slipped on a patch of accumulated grease.
The jury found Anaconda seventy percent negligent, the subcontractor twenty percent negligent, and the employee ten percent contributorily negligent. However, Anaconda claimed that
it should be indemnified by the subcontractor as a result of an
indemnity clause in the subcontract.14 Relying on Algrem and
12. 37 Wis. 2d at 78, 154 N.W. 2d at 220, citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 297 N.W. 436 (1941), and Zulkee v. Wing, 20 Wis.
429 (1866).
13. 43 Wis. 2d 36, 168 N.W.2d 112 (1969).
14. Id. at 53, 168 N.W.2d at 121-22. The indemnity clause provides:
Contractor shall at all times indemnify and save harmless Anaconda American
Brass Company on account of any and all claims, damages, losses, litigation,
expenses, counsel fees and compensation arising out of any injury (including
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Mustas, the court rejected this assertion and held that Anaconda was not contractually entitled to be indemnified for that
portion of the recovery attributable to its own causal negligence
because the contract did not expressly provide for such indemnification.
Algrem, Mustas and Anaconda,15 taken together, established the following rules of construction of an indemnity
clause: first, the clause itself must be strictly construed, and,
second, a contract seeking to indemnify an indemnitee against
his own negligent acts must contain an express provision to
that effect. After Anaconda, it appeared settled in Wisconsin
that a contract containing an indemnity clause is governed by
these two tests.
I.

THE LEASE/INSURANCE PROBLEM

In spite of the strict construction tests adopted by Algrem,
Mustas and Anaconda, the court adopted a more liberal rule
of ascertaining contractual intent in leases with provisions requiring the indemnitor to purchase insurance. The first case to
employ the more liberal construction was Herchelroth v.
5 a decision which was not cited in the Anaconda case.
Mahar,"
Herchelroth involved the lessor of a truck who agreed in the
written lease to indemnify the lessee. The lease provided that
"[tihe lessor agrees to secure and pay for property damage
and public liability insurance on the leased equipment and
save the lessee harmless from any damage thereby during the
duration of this agreement." 7 Herchelroth, the plaintiff, was
injured when his car collided with the leased truck. The lessee,
who was held one hundred percent negligent on a theory of
respondeat superior, claimed full indemnification from the lessor by virtue of the lease. In turn, the lessor argued that since
death) sustained by, or alleged to have been sustained by, the servants, employees or agents of Anaconda American Brass Company or the Contractor, its
subcontractors or materialmen, the public and its servants, employees or agents,
any or all persons on or near the work, or any other person or arising out of loss
or damage to any property, real or personal, if such injury or such loss or damage
is caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions of the Contractor, its
subcontractors or materialmen, or anyone directly or indirectly employed by
them or anyone of them while engaged in the performance of this contract.
15. Anaconda, Mustas and Algrem were followed in Yaste v. American Motors
Corp., 395 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
16. 36 Wis. 2d 140, 153 N.W.2d 6 (1967).
17. Id. at 144-45, 153 N.W.2d at 8 (emphasis supplied).
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the indemnity clause required him merely to procure public
liability insurance, he need only indemnify the lessee for his
failure to do so. The lessor also contended that the parties had
not expressly agreed, as they did in Mustas, to indemnify the
indemnitee against his own negligence.
The trial court agreed with the lessee's claim for indemnification despite the ambiguity of the lease provision, and the
supreme court affirmed. While acknowledging Wisconsin's
adherence to a strict rule of construction when the indemnitee
seeks indemnification for his own negligence, the court nevertheless focused on the intent of the parties to distinguish this
case from that in Mustas. Indisputably, the first clause in the
Herchelrothindemnity provision required the lessor to procure
insurance covering damages resulting from the lessee's negligent acts. However, the court stressed that if the second saveharmless clause was merely a reassertion of the reason for this
purchase requirement, the clause would be independently
meaningless and mere surplusage. As the court noted, the parties could not have intended this result. "The intent[ion] of
the parties here was to affect in some way the .
[indemnitee's] obligation to bear the cost of his negligent acts
and . . . the dispute is . . . the extent to which the . . .
[indemnitor] assumed that obligation." 8 The court emphasized that the indemnitor was unable to show any purpose for
the clause other than to assume responsibility for the indemnitor's own negligent acts. The Herchelrothindemnity clause was
therefore distinguished from that in Mustas on the ground that
while the Mustas clause had been overly broad, it was not
wholly inoperative if interpreted not to require indemnification
of the indemnitee for his own negligent acts.1"
0
In a per curiam decision, Hastreiterv. Karau Buildings,"
the court reaffirmed the holding in Herchelroth.In Hastreiter,
the plaintiff tenant argued that an indemnification provision
in his lease did not apply to the indemnitee landlord's negligence, and therefore, any liability incurred by the landlord's
18. Id. at 146, 153 N.W.2d at 9.
19. Such a construction of the contract is consistent with the rule cited in Goldmann Trust v. Goldmann, 26 Wis. 2d 141, 131 N.W.2d 902 (1965), which declared that
an agreement should be construed to give a reasonable meaning to all provisions of the
contract rather than a construction which leaves part of the language useless or creates
a surplusage in the contract.
20. 57 Wis. 2d 746, 205 N.W.2d 162 (1973).
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failure to install handrails should be borne by the landlord. The
lease provided that "[tihe Lessee agrees to carry and pay for
public liability insurance and to hold the Lessor harmless from
any liability arising21out of the occupance of said leased premises by the Lessee.

The court, citing only Herchelroth, held that the rule of
strict construction announced in Mustas and Anaconda was
simply a rule of construction to be used to ascertain the intent
of the parties, and no more or less inviolate than any rule of
construction aimed at giving meaning to all parts of the agreement.
Here, the court noted, the provision to procure public liability insurance was inserted to protect the indemnitee from liability sustained as a property owner. But such insurance would
extend only to liability for structural defects or failure to repair, since any other liability terminated with the transfer of
possession to the tenant. 2 If the same save-harmless clause
were construed merely as an explanation of the purpose for the
insurance requirement, it would be surplusage. Thus, the saveharmless clause must properly be construed as protecting the
indemnitee from the consequences of his own negligent acts.2
III.

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS REQUIRING INSURANCE

The Herchelroth and Hastreiter decisions both involved
leases rather than construction contracts, but they served to
confuse indemnity clause interpretation. These two cases, com21. Id. at 748, 205 N.W. 2d at 163 (emphasis supplied).
22. In support of the limits of the landlord's liability, the court cited McNally v.
Goodenough, 5 Wis. 2d 293, 92 N.W.2d 890 (1958), and Sheehan v. 535 North Water
Street, 268 Wis. 325, 67 N.W.2d 273 (1954).
23. Between the Herchelrothand Hastreiterdecisions, the court decided another
case involving a lease, Baker v. McDel Corp., 53 Wis. 2d 71, 191 N.W.2d 846 (1971).
The plaintiff brought suit against the lessor (eighty percent negligent) and the lessee
(fifteen percent negligent). The lease provided:
Lessor . . . shall not be liable for any loss . . .resulting from lessee's use,
possession or operation thereof ...whether due in whole or in part to negligent
action of lessor, its agents or employees; and lessee ...hereby agrees to indemnify and hold lessor... harmless from and against all claims, demands, liabilities, suits or actions . . . for such loss ....
53 Wis. 2d at 73-74, 191 N.W.2d at 848.
In response to the lessee's claim that the lease was not ambiguous, and therefore
not subject to construction, the court noted that the nature of the indemnity agreement
itself, and not the existence of ambiguity, prompted the rule of strict construction.
Furthermore, this lease agreement did specifically contemplate such indemnification
and the indemnitee could recover for any liability incurred by its own negligence.
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bined with Mustas and Anaconda, create a double standard for
interpreting indemnification provisions: in a construction contract the court required an express provision to secure indemnification of an indemnitee for his own acts, and in a lease agreement which also requires the indemnitor to procure insurance,
the court required a more general interpretation of the parties'
intent. This ambiguity suggests an interesting problem: what
is the effect of adding to a hold-harmless clause in a construction contract a clause that requires the subcontractor to procure public liability insurance to protect the indemnitee?
Brown v. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co., 4 involved exactly
such a provision in a contractor/subcontractor service contract.
The plaintiff was injured in his home by a natural gas explosion
caused by a leaking gas main. The Wisconsin Telephone Company was laying underground telephone cables near the plaintiff's home and hired Kenneth MacDonald to perform the digging operations. He subcontracted the trenching work to his
brother, Thomas MacDonald, who was inexperienced in the
operation of the trenching machine. The new telephone line
was laid parallel to the Wisconsin Gas Company's main line.
As a result, the trenching exposed the lateral gas lines. During
the trenching, MacDonald damaged seven of the thirteen exposed laterals, which the Wisconsin Natural Gas Company
failed to repair. The trial court found the Wisconsin Natural
Gas Company twenty-five percent negligent, the Telephone
Company fifty percent negligent, Kenneth MacDonald ten percent negligent and Thomas MacDonald fifteen percent negligent. The Wisconsin Telephone Company, however, claimed to
be fully indemnified for its portion of negligence as a result of
its subcontract with Kenneth MacDonald, which read:
The Contractor assumes full responsibility for all injuries to,
or death of any persons and for damages to property, including property and services of the Company, and for all claims,
losses or expenses which may in any way arise out of the
performance of the work, whether caused by negligence or
otherwise, and the Contractor shall indemnify and save the
Company harmless from all claims, losses, expenses or suits
for such injuries, death or damages, and from all liens, losses,
expenses or claims of any sort which may arise out of the
performance of the work, and shall defend, on behalf of the
24. 59 Wis. 2d 334, 208 N.W.2d 769 (1973).
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Company, any suit brought against the Company for any
such damage, injury or death and shall reimburse the Company for attorney's fees and for all other expenses incurred by
the Company in connection with or as a result of any such

suit. The Company may require the Contractor,at the Contractor'sown expense, to take out and maintainsuch public
liabilityand Workmen's Compensation insurance as will provide adequate protection against all such claims and
demands. Certificates of such insurance shall, at the request
of the Company, be filed with it.2
The court held that this contract failed to indemnify the
Telephone Company against its own negligence, because the
contract did not expressly contain such a provision. Despite the
contract's repeated reference to "all claims" and "all losses,"
the court held that the maximum liability of the indemnitee
indemnifiable under the contract was liability vicariously incurred because of the indemnitor's negligence.
In addition, the Telephone Company unsuccessfully
claimed to be entitled to indemnification under common law
principles, irrespective of the contract, based on a "duty of
agents to indemnify their principals for liability the latter incur
due to the agent's negligence or other breach of legal duty.""6
The court rejected this argument because the apportionment
of negligence attributed to the Telephone Company resulted
from their own breach of supervisory duties and was not vicariously incurred as a result of the agency relationship.
The judicial analysis in Brown did not differ significantly
from that in Anaconda or Mustas. It is noteworthy, however,
that the court made no reference to the insurance provision
present in the Brown contract, even though the court was obviously cognizant of the importance of this provision, since it
cited Herchelroth to support the validity of indemnity contracts in general. The contract itself granted the Telephone
Company the option to require both public liability and
worker's compensation insurance; however, the decision does
not state if such insurance was ever procured.
Because the court failed to resolve the insurance clause
question, several interpretations of Brown are possible: First,
the indemnitee's option to require insurance in a construction
25. Id. at 352, 208 N.W.2d at 778-79 (emphasis supplied).
26. Id. at 354, 208 N.W.2d at 779.
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contract has no bearing upon the indemnification agreement;
second, the indemnitee's failure to request the insurance (if in
fact such was the case) made the optional provision surplusage; or third, the presence of an insurance requirement,
whether optional or not, has no bearing in a construction contract as opposed to a lease, because of the different relationships of the parties and the greater potential liability present
in the construction situation. The third interpretation, in effect, distinguishes a construction contract situation from the
lease situation in Herchelroth and Hastreiter,just as the court
attempted to do in those two decisions.
Faced with these potential interpretations of Brown, in
27
Bialas v. PortageCounty the court decided to ignore them all.
In Bialas, the Wisconsin Department of Transportation contracted with Portage County to repair a state highway. Thomas
Gross, an inspector for the state, together with Portage County
employees, removed a building from the highway right-of-way
by burning it. After Gross left the scene, the fire spread and
destroyed the plaintiff's barn. Gross was held seventy-three
percent negligent and Portage County twenty-seven percent
negligent. The state cross complained against Portage County,
claiming full indemnification by the following contract language:
The contractor [Portage County] and his surety shall indemnify and save harmless the State, its officers and employees, from all suits, actions or claims of any character brought
because of any injuries or damages received or sustained by
any person, persons, or property on account of the operations
of the said contractor; or on account of or in consequence of
any neglect in safeguarding the work, or through use of unacceptable materials in constructing the work; or because of
any act or omission, neglect or misconduct of said contractor;
...or from any claims or amounts arising or recovered under
the Workmen's Compensation Law . . . [t]he contractor
shall also comply with all of the above requirements indemnifying and saving harmless the county, town, or municipality
in which the improvement is made and each of them separately or jointly and their officers and employees ... It shall
be the contractor'sresponsibility to see that all of the contract operationsincident to the completion of his contractare
27. 70 Wis. 2d 910, 236 N.W.2d 18 (1975).
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covered by public liability and property damage liability
insurance in order that the general public or any representative of the contracting authority may have recourse against
a responsible party for injuries or damages sustained as a
result of said contract operations. This requirement shall
apply with equal force, whether the work is performed by the
contractor, or by a subcontractor or by anyone directly or
indirectly employed by either of them. 8
The state relied upon Herchelrothand Hastreiterin arguing
that the requirement of insurance evidenced an intent to indemnify fully the indemnitee, and that if the indemnity clause
was limited to indemnifying the acts or omissions of the contractor, it could not be harmonized with the insurance requirement which was intended to fully indemnify the indemnitee.
The court rejected this contention. The insurance requirement
in this contract was for a "separate, distinct, and stated purpose," namely, to assure the general public or any representative of the contracting authority recourse against a solvent defendant. Therefore, in contrast to Herchelrothand Hastreiter,
Bialas holds that the insurance provision here has another
meaning other than protecting the indemnitee against his own
negligence, i.e., protecting the general public and the contractor from an insolvent subcontractor. The indemnity provision
can be strictly construed, and the refusal to indemnify the
indemnitee against his own negligence does not render either
clause useless in light of the other.
In Bialas, the court indicated that this case was controlled
by and analogous to both Young v. Anaconda American Brass
(despite its total absence of an insurance requirement) and
Brown v. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. (where the insurance provision was not even mentioned). Therefore, the indemnitee,
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, could not obtain
indemnification for its employee's acts or omissions, since an
express contract provision to this effect was not present. The
court concluded that "[u]nder the uniform holdings of this
court, an obligation to indemnify under those circumstances
will not be found by implication; and, at the most, the insurance provision only arguably implies such an obligation."2
28. Id. at 913-14, 236 N.W.2d at 20 (emphasis supplied).
29. Id. at 918, 236 N.W.2d at 23.
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Bialas seems clearly to indicate that in Wisconsin, a construction contract which does not expressly indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence will be strictly construed to
prohibit such a result. Adding a provision that the indemnitor
purchase public liability insurance will not alter that strict
construction if the court can find either a stated or implied
purpose for the insurance other than merely to protect the indemnitee against his own negligence. The Brown decision did
not mention a separate purpose for the insurance; Bialas
placed great emphasis on the existence of a separate purpose,
although the case falls short of requiring an express provision
in the contract to that effect.
As a result of Bialas, if a contract contains both an indemnity provision and an insurance requirement, the indemnitor
must show a separate purpose for the insurance requirement to
avoid falling under the Herchelroth and Hastreiterstandard
which reconciles the insurance requirement with the indemnity
provision to provide full indemnification of the indemnitee.
IV. ANALYZING A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
In light of Wisconsin law, the subcontractor-indemnitor
under a standard construction contract, containing both an
indemnity provision and an insurance requirement, can limit
its indemnification liability only by showing that the insurance
requirement has some purpose other than fully protecting the
indemnitee against his own negligence. If it does have such a
separate purpose, then the indemnity provision is not rendered
useless, prohibiting indemnification of the indemnitee against
his own negligence."
The subcontractor-indemnitor may utilize four arguments
in favor of a strict construction of the contract. First, the subcontractor will typically be given a contract prepared by the
general contractor, that is, an adhesion contract. Any ambiguity in an adhesion contract must be construed against the party
preparing it. 3' This rule of construction of adhesion contracts,
combined with the Mustas rule of strict construction of in30. 4 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, §§ 47:134,
47:244, 47:249, 47:250 (1971); 3 MODERN LEGAL FoRMs, Building Contracts, §§ 1650,
1650.1, 1650.2, 1650.3, 1650.4, 1651.1 (1963); 2 NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS
ANNOTATED, Building and Construction Contracts, §§ 2.1210, 2.1211, 2.1134 (1971).
31. Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 226 N.W.2d 414 (1975); Kuranda v.
O'Connor, 23 Wis. 2d 51, 126 N.W.2d 568 (1964).
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demnity contracts and the requirement of an express provision
for indemnification for the indemnitee's own negligence, imposes a heavy burden on the indemnitee to show that the contract evidences an intent to indemnify him for his own negligent acts and omissions. Generalized contract language, which
encompasses a variety of potential liabilities, will not satisfy
the specificity requirements of Mustas, Anaconda, Brown and
Bialas.
Second, the two cases which allowed full indemnification,
Hastreiterand Herchelroth, both involved leases rather than
construction contracts. In Herchelroth, the court made an attempt to distinguish Mustas on its facts without indicating its
reasons for doing so. 3 2 The only real distinction between the
lease and the construction contract lies in the potential liability of the indemnitor. The landlord-indemnitee gives up control of the premises to the tenant and remains liable under the
safe place statute only for structural defects and for failures to
repair.3 3 On a construction site, however, the owner, general
contractor and subcontractor can be liable under the safe place
statute, depending upon who retains the right of supervision
and control.
In a lease, an insurance requirement, combined with an
indemnity agreement, is therefore construed to protect the
lessor-indemnitee against his own acts of negligence, because
the duties of the parties are distinctly outlined once the lessor
gives up possession. Because the lessor is not liable for the acts
of the tenant, a lease requiring the tenant to provide insurance
protecting the landlord can only intend to indemnify the land32. 36 Wis. 2d at 146, 153 N.W.2d at 9.
33. McNally v. Goodenough, 5 Wis. 2d,293, 92 N.W.2d 890 (1958).
34. Wis. STAT. § 101.11 (1973); Barth v. Downey Co., 71 Wis. 2d 775, 239 N.W.2d
92 (1976); Johansen v. Woboril, 260 Wis. 341, 51 N.W.2d 53 (1952) (control of the
premises need not be exclusive); Potter v. Kenosha, 268 Wis. 361, 372, 68 N.W.2d 4,
10 (1955) which states in regard to control of the premises:
We are constrained to hold that when an owner turns over to an independent
contractor the complete control and custody of a safe place, whereon or whereunder the contractor creates a place of employment for the purpose of fulfilling
the terms of the contract, the owner reserving no right of'supervision or control
of the work excepting that of inspection or to change the plan with reference to
the construction to be furnished, if thereafter in the performance of the work
under the contract the premises are changed by the contractor and as a result a
hazardous condition is created, the owner does not become liable to the contractor's employee injured as a consequence of such hazardous condition while acting in the scope of his employment.
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lord against his own negligence, since he is not liable for any
negligent acts of the tenant.
Conversely, on the construction site, it is likely that the
subcontractor will be working in areas occupied by any number
of parties, including the general contractor, other subcontractors or the general public. As a result, liability can be incurred
by several parties to frequenters or employees over whom they
have little, if any, control. In fact, on a construction site, exposure to liability is correspondingly greater because of the overlapping duties. The greater exposure to liability may explain
the court's hesitancy to expand one party's liability to cover
another's negligence.
Third, if the court allows the general contractor (or the
owner, as the case may be) to be fully indemnified against his
own liability, the general contractor or owner could benignly
neglect his safe place duty, assured of full indemnity by the
subcontractor insurer.
Finally, the subcontractor should argue that an insurance
requirement in the construction contract does have a separate
purpose, whether stated or not, which must be considered in
conjunction with the strictly construed indemnity provision.
In Wisconsin, because many different parties exercise control over the construction site, there is a strong likelihood of
shared or joint liability, as is illustrated by Mustas, Anaconda,
Brown and Bialas. Frequently, the injured party is an employee of the subcontractor. 5 In Wisconsin, every defendant
who is found liable to the plaintiff is liable for the entire judgment, not just that portion of the negligence attributed to the
defendant. 3 Normally, an action for contribution reduces the
inequity of this rule, giving the defendant who pays the right
to reimbursement for that portion of negligence allocable to the
other defendants.
35. See, e.g., Young v. Anaconda American Brass, 43 Wis. 2d 36, 168 N.W. 2d 112
(1969); Mustas v. Inland Const. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 194, 120 N.W. 2d 95 (1963); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 297 N.W. 436 (1941).
36. Fitzgerald v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Wis. 2d 321, 227 N.W.2d 444
(1975); Caldwell v. Piggly-Wiggly Madison Co., 32 Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966);
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); Farmer's Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959). Of course, a joint
tortfeasor who is liable for all or any part of the judgment is not liable for that portion
of contributory negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
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However, in Wisconsin a third party joint tortfeasor is not
entitled to contribution from a negligent employer of the plaintiff injured in the course of his employment. 37 The employer's
sole monetary liability to the employee is determined under the
Worker's Compensation Act.3 8 The employer is strictly liable to
the employee for any injury incurred in the course of his employment, but is insulated by the statute from claims for contribution by third-party joint tortfeasors. 3 However, even
though the employer is not liable to the employee beyond the
worker's compensation award, his negligence is computed by
the jury because a fair apportionment of third party negligence
can only be obtained by a consideration of all the causal negligence contributing to the plaintiff's injuries.'"
As a result of the Wisconsin method of computation of damages, if the injured plaintiff is an employee of the subcontractor, that subcontractor's liability is limited to the extent of the
worker's compensation payment. If the plaintiff subsequently
recovers damages in a third party action against the general
contractor, then, regardless of the apportionment of damages
to the subcontractor, the general contractor will be held liable
for all of the damages and will be barred from seeking contribu41
tion from the negligent subcontractor.
37. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1973), as amended by 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 147, § 54(1):
Where such conditions [of liability] exist the right to the recovery of compensation pursuant to this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer
and the worker's compensation insurance carrier.
38. Globig v. Greene & Gust Co., 201 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Lampada v.
State Sand & Gravel Co., 58 Wis. 2d 315, 206 N.W.2d 138 (1973); Wisconsin Power &
Light Co. v. Dean, 275 Wis. 236, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957); Buggs v. Wolff, 201 Wis. 533,
230 N.W. 621 (1930).
39. In addition to the employer's protection from contribution, the employer's
worker's compensation insurer is entitled under Wis. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1975) to reimbursement of policy payments from any negligent party, regardless of the degree of
liability attributed to the insured employee.
40. Connar v. West-Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d
660 (1975). The inclusion of the employer's negligence could result in such a reduction
of the negligence allocated to the third party that the plaintiff's contributory negligence might bar recovery.
41. The inequality of denying the third party joint tortfeasor's recovery from the
negligent employer was raised in Susspan Eng. & Const. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975). The Florida Supreme Court held that by denying
the third party tortfeasor any action in contribution against the negligent employer,
the Florida Workmen's Compensation Statute, FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1972), violated the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment because it
arbitrarily prevented the third party tortfeasor's constitutionally guaranteed access to
the courts.
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Nevertheless, the subcontractor's statutorily limited liability may be contravened by contract, 2 and, therefore, an indemnity provision in the subcontract allows the general contractor to recover that portion of negligence allocated to the
subcontractor. In effect, this contract provision allows the contractor to circumvent the prohibition of the worker's compensation law against contribution.
By protecting the joint tortfeasor-general contractor from
sole liability to the subcontractor's injured employee, the indemnity provision in the contract has an independent meaning
even if construed strictly and held not to indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence. Likewise, the insurance requirement independently assures the general contractor of the subcontractor's solvency and allows him to recover either contribution or indemnity as the situation requires. Each clause has a
separate purpose and, when read together, complement each
other without resulting in indemnification of the indemnitee
against his own negligence.
To overcome the subcontractor's attempt to limit his indemnification liability, the general contractor-indemnitee
should rely on Herchelroth and Hastreiterfor the proposition
that a strictly construed indemnity provision has no meaning
when read in light of the insurance requirement. However,
given the court's reluctance to allow a party to avoid liability
for his own negligent acts, this argument is weak. The general
contractor's best course of action lies in preventing the issue
from ever arising by drafting an express statement of complete
indemnification into the contract.
Confronted with a contract purporting to indemnify the
indemnitee against his own negligence, the subcontractor faces
a difficult problem if the contract also contains a clause requiring the subcontractor to purchase liability insurance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has muddled the clear rule of strict
construction adopted in Mustas by utilizing a more liberal
See also Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Dean, 275 Wis. 236, 81 N.W. 2d 486
(1957), where the plaintiff argued that statutory denial of contribution rights was a
deprivation of the third party tortfeasor's property without due process of law. The
court refused to deal with the issue because plaintiff raised it for the first time on
appeal and therefore waived it.
42. Hintz v. Darling Freight, Inc., 17 Wis. 2d 376, 117 N.W.2d 271 (1962); A. 0.
Smith Corp. v. Associated Sales & Bag Co., 16 Wis. 2d 145, 113 N.W.2d 562 (1962);
Huck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 5 Wis. 2d 124, 92 N.W.2d 349 (1958).
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standard to determine the intent of the leases involved in
Herchelroth and Hastreiter. That liberal standard was partially applied to construction cases in Bialas. In Bialas the
court added to the rule of strict construction by implicitly
adopting a separate purpose requirement for the insurance provision in distinguishing Bialas from the lease cases on the basis
of the stated purpose of the insurance provision. This requirement necessitates the above recommended analysis in order for
the subcontractor to show the existence of a separate purpose
for the insurance provision. Thus, when the contract contains
an insurance provision, a separate purpose for the provision is
an added requirement to the heretofore unqualified rule that
indemnity clauses will not be held to indemnify the indemnitee
against his own negligent acts absent an express statement to
that effect. By negative inference, Bialas leads to the conclusion that if the subcontractor fails to show a separate purpose
for the insurance, then the contract will be construed to indemnify fully the indemnitee, despite the absence of an express
provision to that effect. Yet such an interpretation is unsatisfactory on the basis of the two cases involving leases, both of
which the court itself attempted to distinguish on the facts.
Hopefully, at its next opportunity, the court will return to the
precedent established in the early construction cases of
construing the contract strictly and of requiring an express
intention to provide for full indemnity of the indemnitee.
Ross A.

ANDERSON

